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Abstract: This paper presents the STAMP (system-theoretic accident modeling and processes) accident model, based on systems 
theory, and describes its application in the context of risk prevention related to the remediation of contaminated sediments. The 
implementation of the model is described, and results are presented both in methodological and technical terms. The goal of this 
article is to emphasize the need of new approaches to take into account hazards and accidents within socio-technical systems. 
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1. Introduction 
Remediation methods for contaminated sediments 
are now proved very effective in the treatment and 
management of contaminants. These methods use 
diverse techniques, and provide appropriate solutions 
for the treatment of sediment which originates from a 
variety of sources and has various consequences for 
the environment and people. However, these 
particularly novel and complex treatment technologies 
require a comprehensive hazard analysis. The analysis 
should aim to characterize all threats and risks 
(damage to people, equipment, local residents, the 
environment etc.), going beyond simple technical 
aspects related to the industrial process. This goal led 
to the search for a systems-based accident model, 
capable of meeting these criteria. The STAMP 
(systems-theoretic accident modeling and processes) 
accident model was chosen to characterize the 
dangers of an innovative remediation process known 
as Novosol®. The analysis was carried out through 
the application of the STPA (STamP-based analysis) 
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technique, associated with the STAMP model. 
The following text is divided into three parts. The 
first describes the problem of contaminated 
sediments and their danger to ecosystems and human 
health. Given these dangers, conventional treatment 
approaches are discussed. This first part also 
describes the Novosol® technology, a treatment 
process for contaminated sediments. The second part 
deals with the STAMP accident model developed at 
the MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) by 
Professor Nancy Leveson, and the associated STPA 
technique, used for safety assessment. The third part 
presents the application of the STPA technique to the 
Novosol® system and outlines the results obtained. 
The aim here is to formulate safety recommendations 
focused on the overall socio-technical system in 
question. 
2. Contaminated Sediments and Novosol® 
This section discusses the issue of contaminated 
sediments. It is divided into three subsections. The 
first describes the environmental and health hazards 
arising from contaminated sediments. The second briefly 
discusses the treatment options available. The third 
D 
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describes the Novosol® process (designed and developed 
by Solvay Company), of industrial treatment and 
remediation. 
2.1 Contaminated Sediments: The Hazards 
The natural environment is subject to numerous 
sources of contamination. Whether of industrial, urban 
or agricultural origin, they contain a rich variety of 
sedimentary pollutants. The damage caused by 
contaminated sediments has real environmental, social 
and economic costs. Not only are they the source of 
substantial loss of income due to the decline and 
contamination of animal and plant species, but they 
are also the cause of health problems for ecosystems 
and local populations. Dredging may also be required 
because sediments can cause an increased risk of 
flooding in certain areas, or reduce the draft of some 
waterways. 
The main contaminants (cadmium, copper, 
chromium, lead, zinc, PCBs (polychlorinated 
biphenyls), PAHs (polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons), 
and arsenic) arise from industrial activity (Table 1). 
The contamination they cause varies widely from one 
sediment to another and the health effects on both 
plant and animal populations can be dramatic 
(changes in, or destruction of aquatic ecosystems, 
development of pathological genes, etc.).  
2.2 Contaminated Sediments: Treatment Solutions 
The treatment of contaminated sediments poses 
significant technological, economic and environmental 
challenges. It can reduce pollution levels to the point 
 
Table 1  Sources of sedimentary contaminants (the sign “●” means “a source of”). 
Industrial sector Cadmium Copper Chrome Lead Zinc PCB 
Steel/iron    ● ● ● 
Aluminium ●  ●    
Anti-fouling paint  ●  ●   
Electrical appliances ● ●  ● ● ● 
Automobile ● ● ●  ● ● 
Batteries    ●   
Rubber     ●  
Shipyards ● ● ●  ● ● 
Chemical ●  ●    
Leather/tanning   ●    
Detergents/surfactants     ●  
Water/gas/electricity distribution     ●  
Explosives  ●     
Extraction of precious minerals    ● ●  
Oxide production  ● ●  ●  
Metal finishing ● ● ● ● ●  
Steam power ● ● ● ●   
Electroplating  ● ● ● ●  
Munitions  ●   ●  
Photography   ●    
Pigments/inks    ●   
Printing plates     ●  
Plastics    ●   
Metallurgical processes     ●  
Oil refining    ●   
Diverse sources ● ● ● ● ●  
Wastewater treatment  ● ● ● ● ● 
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where sediments cleaned in this way can potentially be 
reused or recycled. The sediment is analyzed in order to 
select the appropriate technology and more importantly, 
to estimate the cost (Table 2). The fact that some 
processing techniques can themselves have an 
environmental impact, due to the release of 
contaminated water and/or gas into the natural 
environment needs to be taken into account. It must 
also be noted that all technical treatments of 
contaminated sediments that remove, store or treat 
contaminated sediment involve the breakdown and 
release of contaminants during the extraction operation.  
Underwater sediments that are broken down in situ 
can cause contaminants to become suspended in the 
water column. The treatment solution must ensure that 
the level of these contaminants is as low as possible. 
2.3 Treatment Solutions: The Novosol® Procedure 
In 1993, Solvay SA began the development of 
Novosol® [1] initially to deal with fly ash from 
incineration then, from 1999, for a range of 
contaminated sediments. It responds to a wider need 
for the treatment of contaminated sediments and is 
operated under license by a company (or local 
collective) involved in environmental protection [2]. 
The process is divided into two treatment stages [3]:  
Stage A: phosphation, which stabilizes heavy 
metals in the sediment (Fig. 1); 
Stage B: calcination, which destroys organic matter 
and provides usable products such as bricks or 
material for making roads (Fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 1  Steps A and B of the Novosol® process. The two 
steps are complementary and independent, and produce no 
waste or liquid effluents. Stage A: heavy metals are 
stabilized by capturing them in a calcium phosphate matrix, 
Stage B: organic compounds are destroyed by calcination 
(650-900 °C = 1,200-1,650 °F) [3]. 
 
Table 2  Treatment techniques for contaminated sediments. 
Treatment techniques Application Characteristics Effectiveness Cost 
Biological treatments 
 Pesticides, hydrocarbons, PCBs, aromatic chlorides 
pH 4.5-8.5 
Temperature 59-167 °C 
Hydration 40%-80% 
Depends on the 
volume to be treated Fairly high 
Physicochemical treatments 
Dechlorination 
 
Dioxins, PCBs, 
chlorobenzene 
pH > 2 
Temperature 158-302 °C 
Hydration < 20% 
 > 98% effective for 
PCBs High 
Solvent extraction 
PCBs, volatile organic 
compounds, aromatics, 
metals 
Organic compounds < 40%
Solid portion < 20% 
Around 90% effective 
for PCBs High 
Soil leaching Heavy metals, aromatics, PCBs, pesticides Particle size 0.063-2 mm 
90%-99% for volatiles 
and 40%-90% for 
semi-volatiles 
High 
Solidification/stabilization Inorganic compounds, oily sludge and solvents  
Fully effective on 
inorganic compounds Relatively low 
Thermal treatments 
Calcination Volatile and semi-volatile compounds, dioxins 
Hydration < 50% 
Particle size 1-2 mm 
More than 99% for 
organic compounds Very high 
Desorption at low temperature Volatile and semi-volatile compounds  99% High 
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Fig. 2  An example of product re-use in road building [3]. 
 
A system like this, which brings together 
technology for the treatment of contaminated 
sediments and a large number of people on the ground, 
creates a high level of activity and risk, which must be 
controlled. Control is achieved through the application 
of the STPA risk analysis technique, which is 
associated with the systems-based accident model 
STAMP. STAMP facilitates a global risk analysis of 
the socio-technical system [4]. 
3. The STAMP Model and the STPA 
Technique 
The accident model described in this section is a 
systems-based model. It was developed in the 2000s 
by Professor Nancy Leveson at the Complex System 
Research Laboratory of the MIT (Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology), and addresses the limitations 
of traditional accident models. This section is divided 
into three subsections. The first highlights the value of 
systems-based accident models in general. The second 
describes the STAMP model in particular. The third 
describes the STPA technique which has been 
developed from the STAMP model. 
3.1 Systems-Based Accident Models 
Any complex system has its own dynamics which 
have evolved during its lifetime, and are the results of 
the activities that link its elements. This dynamic is 
subject to the interplay of various factors, which 
follow certain rules and principles and which, over 
time, control the system state. Seen from a system 
safety perspective, the challenge is to always keep in 
mind that in such a dynamic system, a stable dynamic 
system state can become an unstable dynamic state. 
Modern technologies have a significant impact on the 
very nature of accidents and risks. In order to 
understand them, new explanatory mechanisms must 
be established. At the same time new techniques for 
risk assessment must be developed to prevent 
accidents occurring [4]. 
Systems-based accident models enable a better 
description and understanding of the links between 
diverse factors across different hierarchical levels. 
They thus facilitate the study of problems in a way 
which makes it possible to have a global view of the 
socio-technical system. Systems-based accident 
models are distinguished from other models in that 
they describe the process of an accident as a set of 
interconnected and complex events, while sequential 
models [5] and organizational models [6] simply 
present a linear description of the accident. In 
systems-based models, an accident occurs when 
several factors (human, technical, environmental) 
come together in a specific place and time [7]. 
Models based on systems theory view accidents as 
emergent phenomena which are the result of 
interactions between components of a system. 
Interactions between these components are nonlinear 
and consist of many feedback loops [8]. In effect, 
safety is only established by interactions between 
elements of a system and does not constitute the 
property of an individual element. Systems models 
derive from general systems theory [9] which 
proposes principles, models and laws in order to 
understand relationships between the elements of a 
complex system. From this perspective, a system is 
not seen as a static representation, but rather as a 
dynamic process, constantly adapting in order to 
achieve its objectives and responding to internal and 
external changes.  
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Systems-based accident models therefore aim to 
study the dynamic, nonlinear properties of the system 
and the migration of an organization under stress into 
a dangerous or even accidental state. The proactive 
nature of these accident models (in terms of risk 
prevention) means that they can address problems that 
affect the system as a whole, rather than focusing on 
specific problems associated with isolated errors, 
taken out of context. This type of model can also take 
into account dynamic aspects by modeling this 
migration within organizations that are subject to 
various global and environmental pressures related to 
their activities and/or issues. 
3.2 The STAMP Model 
The STAMP accident model is based on systems 
and control theory [4]. It was developed by Professor 
Nancy Leveson (MIT). In the STAMP model, safety 
is viewed as a control problem. The STAMP model is 
constructed from three interrelated concepts (safety 
constraints, hierarchical control structures and process 
models), described below: 
 Safety constraints: The concept of constraint is at 
the heart of the STAMP model. In systems theory, 
control always calls for the integration of constraints. 
An accident is not seen as the result of a series of 
events, but as a deficiency or lack of integration of 
constraints at each level of the socio-technical system. 
Safety constraints target the relationships and 
decisions between the many and various system 
variables. These constraints are also associated with a 
control process which aims to manage changes and 
adaptations in system behavior. Unlike the classical 
vision of the accident (that it is due to a sequence of 
events) in STAMP terms, accidents are viewed as the 
inadequate enforcement of constraints within a 
socio-technical system;  
 Hierarchical safety control structures: Accident 
prevention or analysis requires the design of a 
control structure that includes a description of the 
socio-technical system which is as representative as 
possible of a given context. This structure takes into 
account constraints required during both the 
development of the system, and its subsequent 
operation in accordance with functional requirements. 
A control structure can be developed for each 
subsystem of a larger system. Systems theory 
understands a system as a hierarchical structure in 
which each level imposes constraints on the  
activity of the level below it [4, 10]. Accidents result 
from the inadequate enforcement of constraints 
within the hierarchical levels of a given 
socio-technical system; 
 Process models and control loops: A control 
process (within a process model) operates between 
each level of the hierarchy described above. The 
purpose of the control process is to translate an 
“input” from one hierarchical level into a “control” 
over another hierarchical level. This control process 
can operate both upwards and downwards though the 
hierarchy. It is represented diagrammatically as a 
control loop which describes the control process. In 
complex systems, one or more control loops link the 
hierarchical levels of each control structure, with a 
downlink channel providing the information and 
controls necessary to impose constraints on the lower 
level, and an uplink channel which feeds back the 
effectiveness of these constraints. At each level of the 
control structure, inadequate control may result from 
neglect of safety constraints, poor communication of 
safety constraints or safety constraints incorrectly 
applied at the lower level. This is why feedback 
represents such an important dimension in the 
operation of a system. For example, the constraints 
generated by the safety analysis process always 
include assumptions about the operating environment 
of the process. When the environment changes, these 
assumptions become false, and the controls in place 
are no longer appropriate. This discrepancy between 
the environment and the system can become the cause 
of a de-synchronization and the source of 
inappropriate or even dangerous behavior. 
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The effective implementation and operation of the 
STAMP model is achieved through a technology 
known as STPA, presented in the next section. 
3.3 The STPA Technique 
STPA is a systems safety technique developed from 
the STAMP accident model [11]. STPA hazard 
analysis (STamP-based Analysis) was described by 
Leveson and her team [4-12]. The analysis has two 
main objectives: accident investigation and safety 
assessment. STPA hazard analysis is an iterative 
process which facilitates analysis of the origins and 
causes of an accident. In STPA analysis, the system is 
seen as a set of control loops which interact with each 
other. An accident is therefore the result of an 
inadequate control.  
STPA analysis can be used for both accident 
prevention and to evaluate the safety level of a system. 
In the latter case, the aim is to collect information that 
drives a safety-oriented approach to design and 
development. Hazard analysis is essentially a 
procedure which aims to prevent accidents before they 
happen. A proactive approach to accident prevention, 
based on the STAMP model, may provide the 
information necessary for risk prevention and thus the 
occurrence of accidents. 
Current hazard analysis techniques, such as those 
found in operational safety, are not equipped to take 
into consideration the dynamic and complex nature of 
modern systems, in which human-machine 
interactions are important. That said, the objectives of 
an STPA hazard analysis are broadly similar to those 
of a traditional hazards analysis. 
On the one hand, it aims to identify hazards 
throughout the life-cycle of a system as well as safety 
constraints associated with the maintenance of an 
acceptable level of safety; 
On the other hand, it aims to determine how safety 
constraints may be violated and how such constraints 
can lead to inappropriate actions which push the 
system toward an accidental state. 
The STPA hazard analysis process is divided into 
five stages (Fig. 3): 
Stage 1: consists of a preliminary analysis of 
system risk, and in the definition of requirements and 
constraints applicable at the level of the system, in 
order to define safety requirements and constraints to 
be applied to the system as a whole.  
Stage 2: consists of the establishment of the safety 
control structure (the roles and responsibilities of the 
elements and feedback mechanisms). It allows the 
establishment of the safety control structure for the 
system, which include the roles and responsibilities of 
each element, both control elements and feedback. 
This stage will ultimately define and establish the 
control structure for system safety as described by 
Leveson [10]. Every level or element of the control 
structure has roles and responsibilities that help 
determine whether system safety constraints are 
applied or not. Once the system elements to be 
included have been defined, the safety control structure 
must be modeled. 
Stage 3: aims to integrate system requirements and 
constraints for each element of the system. The system 
requirements and constraints defined in Stage 1 must 
be integrated for each element of the safety control 
structure defined in Stage 2. 
Stage 4: involves a detailed analysis of the control 
structure and process models in order to identify 
inadequate controls actions which may play a role in 
the occurrence of an accident. In order to do this, 
inadequate controls actions are classified into four 
types [1]: 
 A control action was not executed; 
 An inappropriate or ineffective control action 
was executed leading to a failure; 
 A potentially correct control action took place 
too early, too late, or at the wrong time; 
 A correct control action was stopped too early. 
Stage 5: is a temporal (immediate, long-term, 
standard) categorization of identified risks (defects in 
control loops). This categorization is done primarily to  
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Fig. 3  The STPA process in safety assessment, adapted 
from Leveson et al. (2004). 
 
determine the impact of inadequate control actions on 
system behavior. Control defects are then dealt with 
by identifying the processes that could lead to a 
breach of one or more safety constraints. 
These five stages together form the STPA 
methodology which is the backdrop for the 
implementation of the STAMP model in an industrial 
setting. The remediation of contaminated sediment 
(carried out using a physicochemical process called 
Novosol®) was selected as the field of analysis to 
make the demonstration. The whole application is 
described in the next section. 
4. Applying the STPA Technique to the 
Novosol® Program 
In this section, each stage of the STPA 
methodology presented above is revisited and 
described in the context of Novosol® as a 
socio-technical system [1]. The level of complexity is 
directly affected by the numerous participants 
involved in the procedure. Implementation of the 
Novosol® program requires the development of a 
Nosovol® facility. In this example, the facility is 
managed by Company A, who are in direct contact 
with Company B. Company B is in charge of the 
operation of the Novosol® process.  
This section is organized into five subsections 
which illustrate each of the five stages of the 
application of the STPA technique to the Novosol® 
program. 
4.1 Stage 1: Preliminary Risk Analysis and Definition 
of Requirements and Constraints at System Level 
During a safety assessment, a preliminary risk and 
hazards analysis is performed at system level, in order 
to define the safety requirements and constraints to be 
integrated. It must be carried out in the early stages of 
the life-cycle of the socio-technical system. This 
preliminary system risk analysis, when applied to the 
Novosol® system, consists of two levels of analysis. 
The first concerns the technical implementation of the 
Novosol® process, while the second focuses on the 
socio-technical aspect of the system, and includes all 
actors in the system and their interactions. This 
approach meets the requirements of the Solvay SA 
group, and the methodology of the STPA hazard 
analysis technique. 
An initial investigation was undertaken in response 
to a request from industry for a risk management 
analysis of the Novosol® system. The request 
concerns risk assessment of the phosphation phase of 
the technical process.  
An occupational risk assessment was carried out 
using compliance and risk analysis software 
(http://www.preventeo.com) followed by a HAZOP1 
analysis. It was apparent that the HAZOP 
methodology is suited to the analysis of the 
physicochemical aspects of the Novosol® procedure 
                                                          
1 HAZOP [3] is a technique for hazard analysis which aims to 
identify deviations in a system or process, often physical and/or 
chemical. 
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[11], and also underlined the fact that, like the STPA 
technique, HAZOP methodology looks for potential 
differences between the desired state of the system 
and its actual condition. However, while HAZOP 
focuses on technical parameters in a technical system, 
STPA deals with control problems in a socio-technical 
system, taking into account human and organizational 
factors. The HAZOP-based analysis was used to 
characterize the initial safety constraints of the 
phosphation phase of the Novosol procedure, which 
are focused on process engineering. 
This set of analyses2 led to the formulation of 
safety recommendations to improve both the design of 
a future Novosol® installation and safety levels in 
preparation for becoming fully operational. They were 
supplemented by a second study and subject to a more 
comprehensive analysis. This second study focused on 
Novosol® as a socio-technical system. It included both 
human and organizational factors at the site, as well as 
the companies involved in the evolution of Novosol®, 
in terms of its development and operation. 
System requirements and constraints are defined for 
each hierarchical level of the system. In this way, for 
the company operating the Novosol® process (Solvay 
SA during the technological development phase) and 
in the current context, requirements and constraints 
can be identified, using the STPA method. They are 
shown in Table 3.  
Taken together, the definitions of requirements and 
constraints for each of the hierarchical levels enable 
the hierarchical control structure to be established. 
4.2 Stage 2: Establishment of the Safety Control Structure 
This second stage allows the construction of the 
safety control structure of the system in question, 
including the roles and responsibilities of each element 
(control elements and their feedback loops) [13, 14]. 
The definition and establishment of the system 
safety control structure [10] is the cornerstone of this 
                                                          
2 Reports containing the results of this work were delivered to 
Solvay SA in 2009. 
STPA stage, each level or element of the control 
structure has roles and responsibilities that aimed at 
ensuring system safety constraints are applied within 
the system. Once the safety control structure has been 
defined, it is necessary to model it. 
The model is built by linking the various 
hierarchical levels using the interactions between 
elements. This stage includes all the actors defined in 
Stage 1, when the requirements and constraints of the 
Novosol® system were established.  
This stage not only provides an overview of the 
system in question, but also highlights the 
interactions between levels in the hierarchy. The 
control structure integrates roles and responsibilities. 
This makes it easier to determine the influence 
elements have on each other (Fig. 4). The structure 
provides a static overview of the whole Novosol® 
system, showing the roles and responsibilities at each 
hierarchical level. These roles and responsibilities 
are used to support the definition and integration of 
constraints (identified in Stage 3) at the level of each 
actor in the structure. 
The purpose of the structure thus defined is to 
represent the interactions between different 
hierarchical levels, and to characterize the controls 
between elements. It sets limits for the analysis that 
will subsequently determine potentially inadequate 
controls between levels. 
4.3 Stage 3: Integration of System Requirements and 
Constraints at the Level of the Element 
The system requirements and constraints defined in 
Stage 1 must be integrated into each hierarchical level of 
the safety control structure defined in Stage 2. This third 
stage is based on the previous two, and aims to integrate 
safety requirements and constraints within each 
hierarchical level. This is done taking into account the 
various interactions between elements. This stage allows 
the definition of requirements which are translated into 
safety constraints, given the various interactions 
between elements of the safety control structure. 
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Table 3  Sample requirements and constraint definitions for the controller (the operating company). 
Company operating Novosol® (Company B) 
Safety constraints and requirements 
Treatment of sediments contaminated by organic compounds and heavy metals 
Responsible for the smooth conduct of inspections and preparation of reports on the use and development of Novosol® in collaboration 
with national and international bodies 
Responsible for defining operational requirements and performance of Novosol® in accordance with national and international 
regulations 
 
 
Fig. 4  Structure of the Novosol® system following analysis using the STPA technique. 
 
From Fig. 4, the higher hierarchical level—for 
example the decision-making level of the company 
responsible for the development of Novosol® 
(Company A)—sets developmental requirements for 
the lower hierarchical level ( the industrial 
development of Novosol®). This lower level must 
provide feedback (control checks) through the 
submission of development reports to the higher level 
(the decision-making level of Company A). This is the 
case for each interaction and each variable.  
In practical terms (at this level of the structure), the 
decision-making level of Company A must define and 
provide requirements for the development of a 
Novosol® facility to the service or entity responsible 
for industrial development. In return, and in order that 
management of Company A is informed of the 
successful integration of these developmental 
requirements (controls), the service or entity provides 
development reports describing the progress of the 
project, including any potential difficulties. 
Specifically, for the two hierarchical levels “the 
decision-making level of the company responsible for 
the development of Novosol®” and “the industrial 
development Novosol®”, the wording might be: “The 
decision-making level of the company in charge of the 
development of Novosol® (Company A) must provide 
developmental requirements to the level responsible 
for the industrial development of Novosol® (Company 
A)”. In return, “the level responsible for the industrial 
development of Novosol® (Company A) must provide 
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reports indicating the progress of development to the 
decision-making level of the company responsible for 
the overall development of Novosol® (Company A)”. 
4.4 Stage 4: Detailed Examination and Analysis of the 
Control Structure and Process Models for Inadequate 
Controls 
In this stage, a detailed analysis of inadequate 
controls is required. The analysis helps to identify 
potentially inadequate controls which may lead to an 
accident. The analysis is based on identification of the 
four types of inadequate controls described in Stage 4 
of the STPA methodology (see Section 3.3). This 
analysis leads to the definition of actual inadequate 
control measures (or potential in the case of a safety 
assessment). For each hierarchical level, inadequate 
controls are defined using the relationships established 
when the control structure was constructed (Table 4).  
Collectively, inadequate control measures are 
translated into constraints and safety requirements 
which have to be integrated at the level of each system 
element (Table 5).  
This translation of potential inadequate and 
defective controls forms an inventory of defects and 
dangers that could lead the system towards an 
accidental state. This list allows the definition of the 
constraints that each hierarchical level must respect in 
order to maintain an acceptable level of safety. These 
inadequate control actions and constraints are termed 
“potential” because they are assumed to exist and are 
only defined in the context of a safety assessment. 
4.5 Stage 5: Categorization of Identified Risks 
The first step is to categorize the risks identified in 
order to determine the impact of inadequate control 
actions on the behavior of the system. The second step 
is to implement a risk management strategy through 
the identification of the process(es) leading to the 
breach of one or more safety constraints. This step 
aims to create a hierarchy of control defects. It aims to 
optimize system safety by first, quickly addressing 
immediate risks that might migrate the system to an 
accidental state, then addressing long-term risks 
(which could lead to an accident at some point in the 
future), then finally tackling “standard” risks which 
are dealt with using a risk management strategy during 
the life-cycle of the system. 
The challenge here is to identify which safety 
recommendations need to be implemented as a 
priority. The identification made it necessary to 
identify in a control loop, a safety constraint may be 
violated. At each level of the loop, and in each 
interaction between loop levels, there may be 
inadequate controls. The goal is, for each hierarchical 
level, to identify inadequate controls that can migrate 
the system to an accidental state. During execution of 
the loop each of these controls may result in the 
creation of an inadequate output control at another 
level, resulting in the migration of the system (Fig. 5) 
into an unstable state. 
Fig. 6 illustrates the “maintenance” level. This 
description of the control loop is simplified, i.e., 
potentially inadequate controls within it are not 
included.  
The “maintenance” control loop, highlighting the 
collection of elements involved in the control process 
at this level, in interaction with the levels “industrial 
development” and “design”. Based on Fig. 5, this control 
 
Table 4  Inadequate control actions for the controller (the company operating Novosol®). 
Company operating Novosol® (Company A) 
(Potential) inadequate control measures 
The decision-making level of the operating company does not provide operating requirements for the safe use of Novosol® to the 
operational level 
The decision-making level of the operating company does not make their developmental requirements known to the decision-making 
level of the company responsible for the development of Novosol® (Company A) 
The decision-making level of the operating company does not provide inspection reports to control bodies 
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Table 5  Potential constraints on the controller (the company operating Novosol®). 
Company operating Novosol® (Company A) 
(Potential) constraints 
The decision-making level of the operating company must provide operating requirements for the safe use of Novosol® to the 
operational level 
The decision-making level of the operating company must make their developmental requirements known to the decision-making 
level of the company responsible for the development of Novosol® (Company A) 
The decision-making level of the operating company must provide inspection reports to control bodies 
 
 
Fig. 5  Inadequate control loop. Actions carried out within the control loop may lead to an inadequate control. These 
potential actions must be identified so that the hierarchical level can provide adequate control. 
 
 
Fig. 6  The “maintenance” control loop [1]. 
 
loop may contain incorrect information that could 
cause an inadequate control output to the “design” and 
“industrial development” levels. 
This and all other loops in the control structure are 
part of the Novosol® system and it is therefore 
essential to analyze them from the point of view of the 
entire system in order to determine the potential 
source of inappropriate controls (Fig. 7). 
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Fig. 7  Description of a control loop within the control structure of Novosol® [1]. Integration of the control loop into the 
control structure illustrates how a given hierarchical level interacts with the rest of the control structure. 
 
This phase of risk categorization begins with the 
development of a Novosol® installation, in the 
analysis of existing control loops, and continues 
throughout its life-cycle, as the organization of the 
control loops changes. 
5. Conclusion 
This article has presented a systems-based accident 
model called STAMP (developed at MIT) and applied 
it to a system for the treatment of contaminated 
sediments.  
The application of a systems-based accident model 
to the treatment of contaminated sediments contributes 
greatly to so-called traditional model of accidents. The 
study of system risk at an organizational level, rather 
than technical risks at a “field” level, can open roads 
to improved solutions for the treatment and recovery 
of contaminated sediments. A task in every day 
becomes a little more complex. 
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